Small Wars: The Legal Challenges by Watkin, Kenneth
I 
"Small Wars": The Legal Challenges 
Kenneth Watkin· 
R ear Admiral Christenson, Ladies and Gentlemen. 
Let me begin by saying what a pleasure it is to finally be here at the Naval War College 
delivering opening remarks at the annual international law conference. I say "finally" 
because as many orrOll know I took a detour, quite literally. While driving here last 
June to look for accommodations, I received a phone call asking if l would be a For-
eign Observer on the Israeli independent commission investigating the Gaza mari-
time incident of May 31, 2010. I accepted and the College was very gracious in 
delaying my start and, I must say, patient in waiting for my return. 
I am not going to comment on the commission, in part because its work is still 
ongoing; however, Part One of its report dealing with the blockade is available on 
the commission website for those who have an interest in the law governing such 
operations. l I will say, however, that if! thought traveling to the Middle East a year 
ago would be my last connection with the Naval War College for a while I was com-
pletely mistaken. Perhaps it should have come as no surprise given the subject mat-
ter of the inquiry, but it seemed everywhere I turned I found myself in touch with 
someone or a learned publication connected to this College. 
The list of former Stockton Professors was itself impressive. They induded, 
most obviously, Mike Schmitt and WolffHeintschel von Heinegg, who direct1yas-
sisted the commission, but also inevitably reference had to be made to the 
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influential works of other Stockton Professors, such as Y oram Dinstein2 and my 
fellow Canadian Leslie Green.) Craig Allen's article "Limits on the Use of Force in 
Maritime Operations in Support of WMD Counter-Proliferation Initiatives," 
found in the eighty-first edition of the International Law Studies series4 (the "Blue 
Book"), was particularly informative regarding the law on stopping ships on the 
high seas. Articles such as Professor Allen's highlight the impact that the product of 
conferences like this can have on real-world international issues.5 
The connection to the College did not stop there. WolffHeintsche1 von Heinegg's 
contribution on blockade to the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Intematimml 
Law is world leading.6 The International Institute of Humanitarian Law's Rules of 
Engagement Handbook,7 brought to life under the steady hand of Dennis 
Mandsager, provided guidance in an area often ignored by international lawyers: 
the right to individual personal self-defense, as opposed to State self-defense, un-
der international law. In addition, the book Naval Blockades and Seapower,8 edited 
by two professors from the Naval War College, Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, 
provided an excellent historical perspective on blockades and maritime interdic-
tion. Finally, NWP I-14M, 11Ie Commander's Hatldbookon the Law of Naval Oper-
atiotl s,9 a product of the International Law Department, served not only as an 
essential source on the law governing blockades. but also, importantly, as an indi-
cation of the views of a specially affected State, like the United States. which then 
could be compared with the more international flavor of the 1994 San Remo Man-
ual. tO Quite impressive influence by the International Law Department, its alumni 
and the much broader Naval Warfare College com munity on an issue arising a 
world away. I can admit to feeling a considerable amount of humility given the 
work of my predecessors as 1 start my sojourn as the Stockton Professor. 
However, we are not here to talk about blockade, but rather "'non-international 
armed conflict," although the relative inattention paid to such conflicts by interna-
tionallawyers until recently reminds me of the reference in the San Remo Manual 
regarding the participants having commenced their discussion of blockade law 
with the question of whether it was "entirely archaic," with some participants ex-
pressing the view it had fallen into "complete desuetude."11 I personally can con-
firm that blockades-and blockade law-have not disappeared and it is clear that 
in looking at both history and the present situation non-international armed con-
flict has definitely not fallen into disuse. 
I want to start with this quote by Colonel Callwell of, at that time. His Britannic 
Majesty's Forces, defining in 1906 a form of warfare known as "small wars": "cam-
paigns undertaken to suppress rebellion and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the 
world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet 
them in the open field. "12 
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Of course, these often are "non-international armed conflicts" by another 
name. Now in case anyone is wondering why a "Naval" War College is concerning 
itself with "small wars," one need not look farther than the United States Marine 
Corps, whose 1940 Small Wars Manual was not only the leading text on the sub-
ject in its day, but also identified such wars as representing the "normal and fre-
quent operations of the Marine Corps."i3 Little has changed, when one considers 
that the Vietnam War and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan qualify in various 
aspects as "small wars," although they are anything but small. I leave it up to you 
to consider whether the Navy and Marine Corps involvement in the air and 
missile strikes at the opening of the Libya operation constituted participation in 
yet another "small war." 
"Small wars" are not new. Unfortunately, neither is the inability of the interna-
tional community to provide the parties fighting such conflicts the comparatively 
extensive and dear legal framework that is in existence for State-versus-State con-
fli ct. Indeed, both operators and their legal advisors should get uncomfortable 
when reference has to be made to an international criminal law treaty, the 1998 
Rome Statute,14 for the dearest convention-based listing of the legal norms appli-
cable to such conflict. IS Indeed, in what is now over a century after Colonel 
Callwell's definition of "small wars" was presented, it is hard not to use the term 
"failure" ---or at least more positively "limited success," if you are a "glass half full" 
individual-when considering how well, in terms of consensus and darity, the ar-
ticulation of the law of non-international armed conflict has fared. 
As most of you are aware a big part of the reason for this "limited success" is that 
States themselves have been very reluctant, indeed often hostile, to the notion of 
clarifying this area of the law. Certainly, the unsuccessful efforts of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (JCRe) to have the rules of international armed 
conflict apply equally to non-international ones during the negotiations of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions stand out as one of a number of examples of that reluc-
tance. What was left was the important, but exceptionally watered-down, Com-
mon Article 3 protections applicable to "conflicts not of an international 
character."16 States, including the brand-new States of the post-colonial period, 
continued to be very concerned that their non-State opponents, existing and po-
tential, would be "legitimized" by their being provided the same rights as States in a 
treaty regime governing armed conflict.l? While I understand the jus ad bellum 
branch of international law governing the recourse to war concerns itself with 
State-versus-State confli ct, and considerable effort is made to ensure the law gov-
erning the conduct ofhostilities,jus in bello, applies equally to all participants, State 
and non-State alike, it is also dear to me one aspect of just war theory, fighting for a 
State as the "right authority" in order to have legitimacy, hangs like a dark cloud 
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over the attempts to reach consensus on the legal regulation of non-international 
armed conflict. In particular, it impacts on issues such as status of participants, 
detention, targeting and direct participation in hostilities (DPH)-the common 
topics of contemporary media headlines. In addition, given the evident lack of con-
sensus as to what law applies to these "small wars," it has left open a much broader 
and more vigorous dialogue regarding how and to what degree human rights law 
governs the use of force, the treatment of detainees and the accountability process 
in internal conflicts. 
Despite claims that international humanitarian law can be applied in its entirety 
to non-international conflicts, and the policies of various States that seek to do just 
that, it appears to me that gaps remain. I also sense, at times, an element of fatigue 
setting in within the legal community regarding these issues. As someone 
mentioned to me recently as we were talking about an upcoming event, there is a 
feeling of "not yet another conference on the interface between human rights and 
humanitarian law." However, ilcannot be a fatigue that is forged with a sense of re-
sounding success. One decade into the twenty-first century many countries are still 
engaged in "small wars," both long- and short-term, and the requirement to re-
solve these issues remains more important than ever. 
I believe there are a number of reasons why this area of the law must be clarified. 
First, non-international armed conflict has been and remains the predominant 
form of warfare. Notwithstanding a growing concern over potential international 
armed conflicts with certain States flexing newfound economic and military 
powers, they remain just that, potential conflicts, which, should they arise, would 
largely be conducted within a comparatively well-developed framework of intern a-
tionallaw-although, as will be discussed shortly, not one without some disagree-
ment. The same cannot be said for the existing and future "small wars" that will 
continue to occupy the attention of States, either because they are occurring within 
their territory or as a result of having deployed expeditionary forces to deal with 
them. Non-international armed conflict will not disappear in the same way that 
blockades were believed by some to have fallen into disuse. 
The prevalence of non-international armed conflict has also been ensured by 
an approach that views only State-on-State conflict as "international" in charac-
ter. However, such "pure" international armed conflicts are by definition increas-
ingly rare. The effect of a determination that a conflict is non-international in 
character is that participants are then immersed in a legal environment that in 
many places lacks the clarity of its international counterpart. In an interesting 
historical note, such determinations can be made virtually overnight. In Afghani-
stan, as early as June 2002, there were declarations that the then-existing interna-
tional armed conflict was over. 18 The conflict from that point was to be considered 
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a non-international one. Of note, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan subse-
quently adopted this categorization for the Afghanistan conflict in 2006. 19 One 
could wonder if the troops on the ground actually noticed the difference. I can tell 
you there was no change in the operational environment, the threat or the com-
plexity of the operations they were conducting. I doubt the legal advice provided 
to them changed either. However, such debates regarding "form" often seem to 
occur without much thought of the resulting legal uncertainty they are imposing 
on participants. The debate over categorizing conflict does cause me to think at 
times of Michael Walzer and , if I can paraphrase him, I think it may fairly be said 
that lawyers do from time to time appear to construct paper worlds which fail 
at crucial points to correspond to the world in which evel)'one else lives.2o It is no 
wonder that for many practitioners the key focus is on whether there is an "armed 
conflict" rather than on a struggle over assessing its degree of "international" or 
"non-international" character. 
It is common to look at the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field of 1863, the famous Lieber Code, as a starting point in 
the effort to codify the rules governing armed conflict. It is quite ironic this effort 
commenced with a conflict that itself in con temporal)' terminology would be 
termed a "conflict not of an international character." Of course, we all know it 
better as a civil war. After nearly one hundred fifty years of working to regulate 
such armed conflict it seems the situation has become less dear. Perhaps the rea-
son the Lieber Code managed to even get off the ground was that it was the prod-
uct of one government rather than an international effort. In this respect the 
suggestion by lohn Bellinger, a former Department of State Legal Advisor, in an 
article on the law about detainee operations in contemporary conflict found in the 
2011 American Journal of Imertlational Law21 appears to have considerable merit. 
He suggests that specially affected States, those engaged in detention operations, 
should get together and work out a recommended common set of legal rules 
governing such operations given the inability of the international community to 
do SO.22 
Unfortunately things actually seem to be getting increasingly muddier. It was 
suggested at a conference I recently attended that because there were no "combat-
ants" in non-international armed conflict there could be no "combatant privilege" 
for State armed forces. Further, the authority for a State to use deadly force would 
have to be found in domestic legislation of the State, even if those soldiers were 
fighting on the other side of the world. While 1 am at a loss to think of any State 
practice of prosecuting its own security forces on the basis there was no empowering 
domestic legislation, it would be interesting to know how many of the States repre-
sented in this room with troops serving in Afghanistan have such specific domestic 
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legislation focused on targeting during a non-international armed conflict in a far-
away land. I would suggest there is strong argument supporting the existence of a 
customary norm of providing State security forces a form of "privilege" in respect 
to the use of force in internal armed conflicts. Perhaps this will be an issue that can 
be discussed and clarified during this conference. 
Second, the lack of clarity regarding the law of non-international armed con-
fli ct can have a profound and sometimes negative effect, not only on the victims 
of conflict, but also on States in terms of whether their actions are viewed as being 
legitimate. What if there had been a greater international consensus on the sub-
stantive law that applied to the detention, treatment, transfer and status review of 
unprivileged belligerents (if one can use that term in a non-international armed 
conflict) detained in the post-9/ll period? WouJd the potential for abuse and alle-
gations of mistreatment have been the same? One cannot help but think that the 
dialogue wouJd have been much different if there bad been greater clarity in the 
law. An application of the policy of treating captured personnel under prisoner-
of-war standards, without providing that status, or as security detainees under 
Geneva Convention IV could have been a practical, defensible and ultimately 
helpful approach. However, even now, some ten years after the issue first arose, 
an internationally agreed framework governing detainees in non -international 
armed conflict is lacking. That it remains a topic of academic debate at this con-
ference demonstrates the distance that must still be traveled on this issue before 
"success" can be declared. 
Third, I also sense from time to time that there is a belief that the issues applicable 
to non-international conflict have no real relevance 10 conflicts between States. 
Perhaps this is simply a reflection of the lack of interest demonstrated by States 
themselves in the regulation of non-international armed conflict. However, there 
can be significant "cross-pollination" of legal issues. For example, a number of 
issues that arise in the conduct of internal "small wars" are also inherent in an in-
surgency being carried out during belligerent occupation, which, of course, occurs 
during international armed conflict. Both occupation and internal conflicts 
ultimately involve what General Sir Rupert Smith has called a "war amongst the 
people."23 In addition, it is highly likely that any future war between States would 
involve not only clashes between regular military forces but also "irregular 
forces," "organized armed groups" or even individual civilians acting on the 
State's behalf. This includes in the cyber realm. Any suggestio n that legal issues 
in non-international armed conflict are not relevant to international conflict 
wouJd have to address the controversial aspects of Additional Protocol J2~ that ap-
pear for nearly thirty-five years to have stood in the way of its universal acceptance 
and application to international armed conflicts.25 
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Fourth, and fInally, the unwillingness of States to engage in clarifying what law 
applies to non -internation al armed conflict has in many respects n egatively im-
pacted on their ability to influence how that law wiD be, and is presently being, 
shaped. As Yoram Dinstein has noted in the most recent edition of his book The 
Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of intemational Armed Conflict, "[ iJnterna-
tionallaw must march in lockstep with the compelling demands of reality. "26 Gaps, 
both real and perceived, are being filled through means such as unofficial restate-
ments of the law and manuals of rules crafted by various groups of legal "experts." 
States do send officials in their personal capacity, although they are often outnum-
bered, and ultimately lack the voice that they would have in offIcial treaty negotia-
tions. The results can be problematic for States. One example is reflected in the 
JCRe's DPH study.27 Now, I am critical of a number of aspects of the study;28 
however, at the same time it must be noted that the ICRC courageously took on 
one of the most perplexing and diffIcult issues of the contemporary law of armed 
conflict--one that States appear to have been "unwilling or unable," to use a con-
temporary phrase, to address. 
My goal today is not to dwell on specific details of the DPH study but rather to 
refer to it as being representative of a trend of suggesting that States should be held 
to a different and ultimately more onerous standard than their non-State oppo-
nents. The study sets out significantly broader parameters for "membership" in 
regular anned forces, and therefore for the forces' ultimate targetability, than it 
does for members in the "organized armed groups" against which they are fIghting. 
In effect, it seems to turn thejusad bellum principleof" right authority" on its head. 
A principle that provided the basis for giving prisoner-of-war status to those fight-
ing for a State, thereby privileging them over their non-State counterparts, now 
seems to mean, if you accept the thesis, those same State actors, indeed many of you 
in this auditorium, can be more easily killed than persons performing exactly the 
same function in an opposing non-State organized armed group. Indeed the non-
State counterparts would be protected from being targeted by being considered to 
be "civilians." 
Ultimately, this approach seems to have a "human rights-like" flavor, where it is 
the State that is always held more responsible and accountable. In a 2010 report to 
the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, when looking at the DPH study, suggested that while some 
may see an inequity betw"een State forces and non-State actors identified in the 
study, it is one built into international humanitarian law in order to protect civil-
ians.29 It is not immediately dear to me that the statistics from the Afghanistan 
conflict support this approach. Indeed, it is reported that in Afghanistan in 2010, 
75 percent of civilian casualties were caused by insurgents.30 It is difficult to see 
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how making insurgents who have demonstrated little reticence about killing unin-
volved civilians more difficu1t to target than their State counterparts enhances the 
protection fo r those civilians. It also points to one of the acknowledged challenges 
of applying hwnan rights norms to contemporary armed conflict. International 
humanitarian law has long sought to have equal application to both sides of the 
conflict, the issue of prisoner-of-war status notwithstanding. Adding new inequity 
to the existing law is not likely to aid in reaching consensus among such significant 
stakeholders in international law as States. 
It seems to me that approaches which do not rely on broadly accepted interna-
tional law-such as approximating what any other detainee captured under the ex-
isting treaty regime in armed conflict would receive, in deciding on the standards 
for the treatment ofthose captured in non-international conflict---or which do not 
evenly apply the law in respect of targeting to all parties to the conflict, are more 
likely to create obstacles rather than help resolve these fundamental issues. 
At the same time, it is difficu1t to see how States can complain about new "soft 
law" and manuals of rules if they do not become more strategically and fully en-
gaged in the processes that are being used to clarify the law. Ultimately, attempts 
will be made to fill voids with or without State participation, and with good reason. 
Civilians must be protected from the ravages of war. The question is the degree to 
which States want to influence that process. 
There are important, indeed essential, issues that need to be resolved. Im-
pressive work is being done. One example is the 2006 Institute of International 
Humanitarian Law Manual on the Law of Non- International Armed COllflict3 l- no 
surprise, again with a link to the Naval War College, its authors being Yoram 
Dinstein, Mike Schmitt and Charles Garraway. Unfortunately, it is a work that has 
not received the publicity that it should and the unsettled State of the law demands. 
As editor of this year's "Blue Book," I will be interested to see how many authors refer 
to this manual in their scholarly assessments of non-international armed conflict. 
Finally, there is this conference, and the inevitable articles in the "Blue Book" 
that will result. I encourage all of you to participate fully and ask probing questions 
of the panelists, thereby shaping the discussion. Indeed, you never know. You, 
yourself, might someday unexpectedly take a detour and become immersed in a 
complicated legal problem related to a "small war" occurring on the other side of 
the world. I do know that you will be able to search the product of this conference, 
and others like it here at the Naval War College, for guidance when dealing with 
non-international armed conflict-the difficult humanitarian law issue of our 
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